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CAMPBELL v. LOUISIANA
118 S. Ct. 1419 (1998)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Terry Campbell was
indicted for second-degree murder in
Evangeline Parish, Louisiana.' Prior to
trial, Campbell filed a motion to quash the
indictment alleging that the grand jury
foreperson selection process in Evangeline
Parish is discriminatory and thus violates
the Equal Protection Clause2 and Due
Process Clause3  of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the Sixth
Amendment's fair-cross-section
4
requirement.5 To support his allegations,
Campbell presented evidence that
throughout the past sixteen and a half-
years,' an African-American had never
served as the grand jury foreperson in
Evangeline Parish, even though African-
Americans constitute more than twenty-
percent of the registered voters.7 The trial
1 Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419, 1421
(1998).
2 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides, in pertinent part; "No state
shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend XIV, § 1.
3 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment states, "No state shall.., deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of the law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
4 The relevant portion of the Sixth Amendment
provides, "In all criminalprosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartialjury... ." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
5 Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1421.
6 The sixteen and one-half years consisted of the
time period between January of 1976 and August
of 1993. Id.
7 Both parties stipulated to these facts. Id.
court denied Campbell's motion based on
its determination that Campbell, a white
man charged with the murder of another
white man, lacked standing to challenge
an all-white grand jury.8
Campbell's first trial resulted in a
mistrial, but he was subsequently re-tried
and convicted of second-degree murder.'
Campbell was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole. 10 In a
motion for a new trial, Campbell renewed
his constitutional challenges to the grand
jury selection process, and was again
denied relief by the trial court." Campbell
then appealed to the Louisiana Court of
Appeal, alleging that the trial court erred
in refusing to quash his indictment on the
grounds that the grand jury selection
process violated the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States
Constitution. 12
Relying on Powers v. Ohio, 13 the
Louisiana Court of Appeal held that
Campbell had standing to raise equal
protection and due process challenges to





12 Louisiana v. Campbell, 651 So.2d 412, 412 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 1995).
13 In Powers, the Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant has standing to object to the
exclusion ofjurors through race-based peremptory
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause,
regardless of defendants' own race. Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991).
regardless of his race. 4 However, the
court determined that the evidence
Campbell presented to the trial court was
insufficient to substantiate his claims."
Therefore, the Louisiana Court of Appeal
remanded the case to the trial court for a
full evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the foreperson selection process
had violated Campbell's constitutional
rights. 6 The appellate court did not
address Campbell's Sixth Amendment
claim or Campbell's additional
assignments of error.'
7
The Louisiana Supreme Court
granted the state's petition for certiorari
and reversed the appellate court's ruling."
Consistent with the finding of the trial
court, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that a white defendant lacks standing to
bring either an equal protection or due
process challenge based on the exclusion
of African-Americans from service as
grand jury forepersons. 9 The Louisiana
Supreme Court determined that the
appellate court erred in relying on Powers
v. Ohio,"0 rather than Rose v. Mitchell"i
14 Louisiana v. Campbell, 651 So.2d 412, 413 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 1995).
15 id.
16 id.
17 Campbell's appeal included a total of eleven
assignments of error. Id.
18 Louisiana v. Campbell, 661 So.2d 1321 (La.
1995).
19 Id.
2 0 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991).
21 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 564-65 (1979).
In Rose, the United States Supreme Court held that
racial discrimination in the selection of a grand
jury constitutes grounds for setting aside a criminal
conviction. However, the defendant in Rose was
held not to have made out a prima facie cased of
discrimination based on his allegation that
discrimination tainted only the selection of the
and Hobby v. United States.22
According to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Rose,
prevents a defendant from bringing a race-
based equal protection claim, unless he is
the same race as the individuals who were
allegedly discriminated against.
2 3
Although the Louisiana court
acknowledged that Powers held that a
white defendant has standing to challenge
the exclusion of blacks from a petit jury,
the Louisiana court refused to expand the
holding in Powers to encompass a
situation involving a grand jury.24 The
court reasoned that the holding in Powers
was based on the "considerable and
substantial impact that such obvious
discrimination by the prosecutor during
voir dire would have on the defendant's
trial as well as on the integrity of the
judicial system as a whole. 25  The
Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that
"[t]he same cannot be said for




Supreme Court held that Hobby prevented
Campbell from maintaining his due
process challenge.27 In Hobby, the United
States Supreme Court held that the
grand jury foreperson. Id.
22 Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 350
(1984). The Supreme Court held that even if
discrimination tainted the selection of the grand
jury foreperson, the white defendant was not
entitled to reversal of the conviction or dismissal
of the indictment against him.





defendant's due process rights were not
violated by discrimination in the selection
of federal grand jury forepersons, due to
the "ministerial nature" of the
forepersons' duties.28 The United States
Supreme Court held that because of the
"ministerial nature" of the forepersons
duties, even if selection of the grand jury
foreperson had been tainted with
discrimination, it would have only an
"incidental effect" on the trial, and thus
does not violate the defendant's due
process rights.29  Finding a grand jury
foreperson's duties in Evangeline Parish
to be similarly ministerial, the Louisiana
Supreme Court determined that any
"discrimination that existed in the
selection of a grand jury foreman from a
properly constituted venire has little, if
any effect on the defendant's due process
right of fundamental fairness."30
Therefore, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held that Campbell lacked
standing to litigate either an equal
protection or due process challenge based
on allegations of discrimination against
African-Americans in the selection of
grand jury forepersons.31  Without
addressing Campbell's Sixth Amendment
claim, the Louisiana Supreme Court
remanded the case to the appellate court to
consider Campbell's remaining allegations
of error.32
28 Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 345
(1984).
29 id.
30 Louisiana v. Campbell, 661 So.2d at 1324.
3 1 id.
32 id.
On remand, the Louisiana Court of
Appeal affirmed Campbell's conviction.33
Campbell applied to the Louisiana
Supreme Court for a rehearing of his equal
protection and due process claims, but the
petition was denied.34 Campbell then filed
for a writ of certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court. The Court granted
certiorari to "address the narrow question
of Campbell's standing to raise equal
protection, due process, and fair-cross-
section claims."'35
HOLDING
The Louisiana Supreme Court held
that Campbell satisfied the three-part test
articulated in Powers to establish third
party standing to raise an equal protection
challenge based on discrimination against
African-Americans in the selection of
grand jury forepersons.36 Specifically, the
Court found (1) that Campbell's
allegations constitute an injury in fact, (2)
that Campbell had a close relationship
with the excluded jurors, and (3) that the
excluded jurors were hindered from
asserting their own rights.37 Additionally,
the Supreme Court held that Campbell has
standing to litigate whether his conviction
comported with due process based on his
allegations of discrimination. 3
ANALYSIS
Prior to determining whether
33 Louisiana v. Campbell, 673 So.2d 1061 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 1996).
34 Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419, 1422
(1998).
35 id.
36 Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. at 1423.
37 id.
381 d. at 1424-25.
100
Campbell could invoke third party
standing to raise his constitutional
objections, the Louisiana Supreme Court
emphasized the difference between the
selection of a grand jury foreperson in the
Louisiana judicial system and the
selection process utilized in the federal
court system.39 In federal courts, after the
grand jury has been selected, the
foreperson is chosen from among the
seated grand jurors.4" Consequently, the
selection of a grand juror to serve as the
foreperson does not alter the total
composition of the grandjury. In contrast,
the Louisiana judicial system requires the
presiding judge to select the grand jury
foreperson from the entire venire pool
before any other members of the grand
jury are seated.4' Thus, in Louisiana the
selection of a grand jury foreperson effects
the total composition of the grand jury.
Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court
determined that Campbell's claim is not
merely a claim of discrimination in the
selection of grand jury forepersons, but
rather is equivalent to a claim of
discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury itself.42
A. The Equal Protection Clause
The Supreme Court held that
Campbell satisfied the Powers test for
establishing third party standing.43
Therefore, the trial court should have
39 The Court also noted that even in state courts,
the selection process utilized by the federal courts
was the dominant process used. Id.
40 id.
41 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 413 (B)
(West 1997).
42 Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. at 1422.
4 3
id.
allowed Campbell to assert the "rights of
black persons not to be excluded from
grand jury service on the basis of their
race."
44
The Supreme Court found that if
Campbell was indicted by a "grand jury
tainted by racial discrimination," he had
suffered an injury in fact. I In explaining
why such discrimination would constitute
an injury in fact, the Court emphasized
that the "grandjury is a central component
of the criminal justice process. '"46
Therefore, regardless of the defendant's
race, race-based discrimination in the
selection of grand jurors "strikes at the
fundamental values of our judicial
system."47 Not only does the grand jury
act "as a vital check against the wrongful
exercise of powers by the state," but the
grand jury also possesses considerable
other powers. 48 For example, the grand
jury determines whether to issue the
indictment, the particular offenses, and the
degree of the offenses that will be brought
against the defendant.49 "The integrity of
these decisions depends on the integrity of
the process used to select the grand
jurors."50 Consequently, to allow racial
discrimination to taint the selection of
grand jurors would call into question the
integrity of the judicial process.5
Therefore, although Campbell's




47 Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,556
(1979)).48 Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411
(1991)).
49 Id. at 1423.
50 Id.
51 id.
seats on the grand jury had been denied to
African-Americans based on their race,
this was sufficient to establish Campbell's
injury in fact." Furthermore, the Court
also noted that Campbell was calling into
question "the impartiality and discretion
of the judge, himself," making his
allegation even more detrimental to the
judicial process. 3
In determining that Campbell has
a "close relationship" with the excluded
grand jurors, the Court relied primarily on
its finding of "a close relationship" in
Powers.4 In Powers, the Court found
that the close relationship between the
defendant and the excluded jurors was
based on their "common interest in
eliminating discrimination from the
courtroom."55 Likewise, the Court found
that the common interest shared by
Campbell and the excluded grand jurors
includes a common interest in "eradicating
discrimination from the grand jury."56
Additionally, the Court noted that it had
no reason to believe that a white defendant
would be a less effective advocate for
excluded grand jurors than he could be for
excluded petit jurors.57
Lastly, the Supreme Court held
that Campbell satisfied the third prong of
the Powers test, which requires that there
be "some hindrance" to the jurors' ability
to protect their own interests. 8 Similar to
the excluded petit jurors in Powers, the





55 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991).
5 6 id.
57 id.
58 Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. at 1424.
Campbell sought to assert also lacked the
economic incentive to bring the equal
protection challenge themselves.59 Not
only are the time and monetary costs of
bringing such an action substantial, but the
meager financial compensation available
provided little incentive for the jurors
excluded because of their race."
Therefore, the Court held that "Campbell,
like any other white defendant, has
standing to raise an equal protection
challenge to discrimination against black
persons in the selection of his grand
jury."
61
B. The Due Process Clause
The Louisiana Supreme Court also
held that Campbell had standing to assert
that his due process rights had been
violated by the alleged discrimination in
the grand jury.2 First, the Court noted that
its decision in Hobby v. United States
63
had rested on the implied assumption "that
a defendant has standing to litigate
whether his conviction was procured by
means or procedures which contravened
due process."' Although the Hobby Court
ultimately determined that the defendant
had not been denied his due process rights,
the Court did not hold that the defendant
was barred from asserting such claims.
The Court explained that in Hobby
the defendant had not been denied due
process even if discrimination had tainted
the selection of the jury foreperson
because the foreperson's duties were only
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1423.
61 Id. at 1424.
62 Id. 1424-25.
63 Hobby, 468 U.S. at 350.
' Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. at 1424-25.
ministerial.6" However, this determination
was based on the fact that the foreperson
was selected from among the seated
jurors, and therefore, "the decision to pick
one grand juror over another, at least
arguably, affected the defendant only if
the foreperson was given some significant
duties that he would not have had as a
regular grand juror."66 The Hobby Court
only looked at the duties performed by the
foreperson because if discrimination had
been a factor in the selection of the
foreperson, those persons who were
discriminated against still had an equal
opportunity to sit on the grand jury.
Therefore, the discrimination could only
impact the indictment if the foreperson
had significant duties that were being
denied to African-Americans.
As previously noted, unlike the
federal system for selecting forepersons
used in Hobby, Louisiana courts require
the judge to select the foreperson from
among the entire venire pool. Therefore,
the inquiry in Campbell v. Louisiana
could not be confined to whether the
foreperson's duties are ministerial as it
was in Hobby.67 In Louisiana, the alleged
discrimination would prevent an African-
American person from even sitting on the
grand jury and thus would impact the
indictment, regardless of the foreperson's
duties.68 Even if a foreperson's duties in
the Louisiana court system are ministerial,
the opportunity to sit on the grand jury is
not ministerial. Therefore, the Supreme
Court held that Campbell "has standing to
litigate whether his conviction was
procured by means or procedures which
"169contravene due process.
C. Fair-Cross-Section
The Supreme Court refused to
address Campbell's claim that
discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury foreman had violated the fair-
cross-section requirement of the Sixth
Amendment.7 ° Although Campbell had
asserted the Sixth Amendment violation in
his initial motion to quash the indictment
and in his petition for certiorari, neither of
the Louisiana courts addressed this claim,
nor did Campbell argue this issue at the
appellate level. Therefore, because
Campbell had not made an "effort to meet
his burden of showing this issue was
properly presented to the Louisiana
appellate courts," the Louisiana Supreme
Court refused to review this claim. 71
CONCLUSION
In Campbell v. Louisiana, the
Supreme Court expanded the class of
individuals permitted to assert third party
standing to raise an equal protection
violation alleging race-based
discrimination. This decision may
indicate that the Court has become less
tolerant of discrimination in the judicial
system, or at least less tolerant of blatant
reoccurring discrimination, such as that
which persisted in excess of sixteen years
in Louisiana.
The Court was rather pliant in its
application of the rigid criteria for
obtaining third party standing. For






example, in finding that the requisite
"close relationship"'72 existed between
Campbell and the excluded African-
American grand jurors, the Court relied on
the theoretical proposition that everyone
has an interest in eliminating
discrimination. Regardless of how
commendable this common interest is, the
Court completely disregarded the fact that
Campbell's motivation for bringing this
action most likely had nothing to do with
eradicating discrimination.73 Campbell's
objective was to have his conviction
overturned, not to raise the social
conscience of Americans.
Consequently, the question
becomes who will benefit from the
Court's holding? In a general sense,
because the Equal Protection Clause was
created to protect the rights of all
Americans, the entire population benefits
from the Court's protection ofthese rights.
The public in general also benefits from
efforts to end discrimination, as race-
based discrimination has been the source
of numerous societal problems throughout
the country's history. Additionally,
assuming that white defendants can be
effective advocates for excluded jurors of
other races, these individuals will benefit
from the Court's ruling. By expanding the
72 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
73 This point was emphasized in Justice Thomas's
separate opinion in which he dissented in part.
Justice Thomas's opinion reiterated his prior
disagreement with the Court's decision in Powers
v. Ohio, and also his disapproval of the majority's
application of the Powers holding in Campbell v.
Louisiana. Justice Thomas would have held that
Campbell did not have standing to litigate the
equal protection rights of excluded jurors of a
different race. Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct.
at 1426-28.
class of individuals who can assert these
rights, the Court has made it more likely
that discriminatory practices like those
alleged in Campbell v. Louisiana will not
continue.
There are also potential detriments
associated with allowing white defendants
to represent the interests of excluded
jurors of another race. The Court has been
restrictive when granting third party
standing in order to ensure that issues are
raised by individuals with a substantial
interest in effectively advocating onbehalf
of the other party. In alleviating the
restrictions on finding a "close
relationship" for third party standing in
equal protection claims, there is a risk that
future non-minority litigants will be less
effective advocates then a member of the
excluded race. However, because criminal
defendants have a substantial penal
interest in the outcome of their
constitutional challenges, this concern
may not materialize.
One important factor that may
have impacted the Court's decision in
Campbell v. Louisiana is the suspect
impartiality of judges in Evangeline
Parish. The Court may have been more
inclined to find that Campbell did have
standing because if his allegations are true
the unconstitutional discrimination was
not only tolerated by the judge, but
actually instituted by the judge. Due to
the special position of the judge in the
American legal system as the ultimate
protector ofjustice, Campbell's allegation
was more momentous than an allegation
of discrimination by another party to the
litigation. When the impartiality of the
judge is questioned, the integrity of the
entire process is jeopardized. Therefore,
perhaps this distinction encouraged the
Court to be fairly liberal in its application
of the doctrine of third party standing.
The Court's opinion leaves
unresolved the appropriate remedy if on
remand the Louisiana court finds that the
grand jury selection process violated the
Equal Protection Clause or Campbell's
due process rights. It is unclear if the
indictnlient must be declared void and the
conviction dismissed or if the conviction
may be upheld on the ground that
Campbell was not prejudiced. Further
litigation of Campbell v. Louisiana would
potentially resolve this issue of the
appropriate remedy.
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